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PRM-11

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ICS 77-2124

10 MAR 1977

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

FROM

:

[REDACTED]

Deputy to the DCI for the Intelligence
Community

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SUBJECT : 17 March 1977 Meeting on PRM-11, Task 2

1. Your memorandum of 8 March 1977 asking principals to designate members for an SCC subcommittee on PRM-11, Task 2, indicated that you would convene a meeting of this subcommittee on 14 March 1977. Holding to that date will now be impossible owing to conflicts on yours and other schedules. We now are scheduling that meeting for the morning of 17 March and must begin planning for it.

2. The main purpose of the subcommittee is to provide a small, high-level forum in which you can exercise your personal leadership on this subject so crucial to your job, and also to allow for a formal exchange among the most important departments and yourself on the role of the Director of Central Intelligence. Beyond this, the subcommittee should provide guidance and review of the Task 2 report. It should not, however, become closely involved in drafting and working-level action, unless certain members so choose. The subcommittee need not meet more than four times prior to the 15 April 1977 completion date for Task 2.

3. It would be appropriate for Hank Knoche or his representative, Dick Lehman, and me to attend the meeting as your most involved executives, but not as additional members of the subcommittee. The Director of Central Intelligence should not be seen as packing the group or fragmenting his institutional base.

4. The objectives of the 17 March meeting should be:

a. to initiate PRM-11, Task 2, procedurally;

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b. to exchange basic departmental views as of this date on PRM-11 as a whole;

c. to establish consensus that the role, responsibilities, and authorities of the Director of Central Intelligence in the Intelligence Community constitute the most essential issues of Tasks 2 and 3;

d. to establish the proper dividing line between Task 2, which is mainly concerned with identification and diagnosis of problem areas, and Task 3, which is to evaluate options. (NSC Staff has expressed some concern that the outline circulated on 8 March 1977 may go too far into Task 3.);

e. to convey your strong conviction that departmental intelligence elements must be free to make candid working-level inputs to the development of the Task 2 report (see paragraph 6, below); and

f. to convey assurances to the key departments that you are approaching the structural and organizational issues of PRM-11 with an open mind; but that you insist the outcome should establish a workable balance between the Community responsibilities which the President and Congress expect you to fulfill and the powers you have to execute them.

5. Subcommittee members should indicate at this meeting who will represent them or if they, themselves, wish to participate in working-level meetings and drafting activity. This will require between four and six hours of meetings per week for the next month. The subcommittee should not be asked to specify all the members of the working group, however. You and your action officers on this task should be free to bring together such persons from any part of the Community as are needed to prepare a sound report.

6. It is of great importance that you establish early with the Secretary of Defense that key defense intelligence elements -- particularly the National Security Agency, Special Air Force, and Defense Intelligence Agency -- may participate candidly and openly in the preparation of the Task 2 report and any follow-on work for Task 3. Your first

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regular meeting with Secretary Brown on 11 March 1977 would be the appropriate point to reach this understanding. The Department of Defense (DoD) cannot be denied the right to establish a unified position for the Secretary of Defense on PRM-11. But, by the same token, the Director of Central Intelligence should not be denied direct access to data and views on alternative mechanisms for executing his responsibilities, where 80 percent of the assets now affected reside in the DoD.

7. Prior to the 17 March 1977 meeting, you shall be supplied with a workbook containing:

- a. background
- b. agenda for the meeting
- c. objectives for the meeting
- d. game plan for working-level action
- e. talking points for you
- f. issue papers on selected topics.

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